Recently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission adopted a rule that assures parties to swaps that, if their trades are submitted to and accepted by a clearinghouse, the collateral that they post cannot be used to cover any other customer's deficit.

This is different from the regime currently governing regulated futures contracts. There, a clearinghouse can use my collateral in its possession to satisfy another customer's payment default if our common clearing member is unable to use its own funds to do so. This was the 1980s lesson from the Volume Investors bankruptcy where massive losses by two customers caused that broker's collapse (a COMEX clearing member) and the clearinghouse used other customers' Treasury Bills to cover the net loss.

In adopting the new rule for cleared swaps, the members of the CFTC acknowledged that futures customers remain less well protected than their swaps brethren, and appeared to recognise that more "fixes" may be needed to harmonize the two policies.

When or if that will happen remains to be seen. This is but one example of how the Dodd-Frank Act inadvertently (or not) can advantage swaps in ways that the existing futures regulatory regime cannot, despite that Act's avowed purpose to draw swaps closer to the CFTC's traditional futures rules.

Other examples include broadening the definition of "swap" to include commodity options, an area that the CFTC had regulated under the futures program since the 1930s; the possibility that swaps calling for physical delivery will be allowed, erasing any distinction from "futures contracts"; and the exemption from exchange-trading and clearing for transactions used by commercial firms for hedging or risk management, a segment not easy to quantify but the word "boatload" comes to mind.

It is all my fault, of course. Things seem to go awry when I get involved, however indirectly. Do you want examples?

After being nominated by President Reagan to chair the CFTC in the spring of 1981, I attended a breakfast at the White House for new appointees, hosted by the President himself. Later that morning, the President was shot at the Washington Hilton hotel. I was never invited back.

Or, I was nominated by the President, endured confirmation hearings, and was confirmed by the Senate as CFTC chair as Philip Frederick Johnson, the name my mother gave to me. Two weeks into the job, I married Laurie Jean McBride. By court order, I became Philip McBride Johnson and my new wife became Laurie Johnson McBride. This, of course, made incorrect the brass plaque newly added to the CFTC reception center, the name plate in the Hearing Room, my business cards, stationery, etc. When I left the agency I asked the Senate staff to replace my pretty confirmation certificates (old name) with new ones. "Only if you go through the whole process again," I was told.

So, if anyone asks whether Philip McBride Johnson ever served as CFTC chairman, the correct answer is "no."

Much remains to be done for the full implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. I will try not to jinx it, too.

Philip McBride Johnson is (not!) a former chairman of the CFTC, Philip Frederick Johnson is